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ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, the number of mobile phones has
increased dramatically, overtaking the world population in
October 2014. In developing countries like India and China,
mobile subscribers outnumber traditional landline users and
account for over 90% of the active population. At the same
time, convergence of telephony with the Internet with tech-
nologies like VoIP makes it possible to reach a large number
of telephone users at a low or no cost via voice calls or SMS
(short message service) messages. As a consequence, cy-
bercriminals are abusing the telephony channel to launch
attacks, e.g., scams that offer fraudulent services and voice-
based phishing or vishing, that have previously relied on
the Internet. In this paper, we introduce and deploy the
first mobile phone honeypot called MobiPot that allow us to
collect fraudulent calls and SMS messages. We implement
multiple ways of advertising mobile numbers (honeycards)
on MobiPot to investigate how fraudsters collect phone num-
bers that are targeted by them. During a period of over
seven months, MobiPot collected over two thousand voice
calls and SMS messages, and we confirmed that over half of
them were unsolicited. We found that seeding honeycards
enables us to discover attacks on the mobile phone numbers
which were not known before.
1. INTRODUCTION
According to reports from the University of Manchester [17]
and the International Telecommunication Union [34], mobile
phone subscriptions have grown over 7% yearly in the last
ten years. Since October 2014, there have been more mobile
phones than people [7]. As of November 2015, the GSMA’s
real-time tracker sets the number of mobile devices to 7.58
billion [16], overtaking the 7.24 billion estimated world pop-
ulation [8]. Countries like China and India have experienced
a huge growth in mobile technologies [27, 6]. For example,
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China has over 1.2 billion active mobile phones with 93%
penetration rate [32].
Cybercriminals, who traditionally relied on the Internet
to commit fraud, consider telephony an attractive target
not only due to its wider reach, but the fact that people
have traditionally trusted it more, making it prone to more
effective social engineering attacks a-la´-Mitnick for stealing
private information or accessing protected systems. As we
fortify defenses on the Internet side, telephony provides an
alternative path to potential victims for the cybercriminals.
They can easily reach such victims with unsolicited calls and
spam SMS messages, which has become a serious problem
in many countries. Social engineering attacks over the tele-
phony channel to reset online banking credential and steal
money have already been reported [20]. Voice phishing at-
tacks can exploit the telephony channel to lure their victims
into revealing confidential information like birthday, resi-
dence, and credit card numbers [22].
Lately, advances in Internet telephony technologies like
VoIP have provided miscreants a fast, cheap, and easy way
to conduct large-scale attacks. For example, fraudsters can
dial and reach victims via voice calls worldwide at very
low cost. Telephony denial-of-service attacks [14] or mas-
sive number of robocalls (one-ring calls) [2] have become
another form of telephony threats. Recently researchers in-
troduced a telephony honeypot (Phoneypot) aimed at inves-
tigating telephony threats, and found evidence of telephony
denial-of-service, unsolicited telemarketing, and debt collec-
tor abuse [13]. Authors used unassigned telephone numbers
– numbers that do not belong to real users – to collect evi-
dence of unwanted calls targeting people in North America.
Their work confirmed the existence of a wide variety of tele-
phony abuse, but did not differentiate landline and mobile
numbers or actively invite or engage attackers for more in-
depth study. In addition to that, the aim of the work was
to study accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of data col-
lected to understand telephony abuse.
In this paper, we introduce and deploy a novel mobile tele-
phone honeypot that we name MobiPot (Mobile HoneyPot)
to gain better understanding of mobile telephony threats.
First, we configure MobiPot with honeycards (honeypot sim-
card numbers) to monitor, engage, and record activities of
potential attackers who target our honeycards via calls and
SMS messages. Unlike email spam, voice calls require active
engagement with the callers to understand their goals. To
the best of our knowledge, MobiPot is the first system to
provide the ability for automated engagement with poten-
tial attackers which enables it to record longer conversations
and therefore gain better insights into the attacks. Second,
we propose and implement several ways to actively advertise
or seed honeycards. This allows us to evaluate the effective-
ness of various seeding techniques, including those that were
not investigated in previous studies. For example, malicious
mobile apps are known to steal contact details (phone num-
bers). By using this seeding method for honeycards, we can
find out if such stolen phone numbers actually get calls or
messages by fraudsters. Finally, we analyze the call and
SMS records to investigate how mobile telephony attackers
behave. This led to multiple insights into attacks, including
the use of both SMS messages and calls in certain coordi-
nated scams.
In summary, our paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose and deploy the first reported mobile tele-
phony honeypot system called MobiPot with honey-
cards that come from multiple regions and providers
in China.
• We seed honeycards in three distinct ways, including
mobile malware, social networks, and abuse lists and
analyze effectiveness of these seeding mechanisms.
• Over a period of seven months, we collected 1,021
SMS messages from 215 senders and 634 calls from
413 callers. By using a semi-automated approach, we
verify that 82.95% of the SMS messages and 57.73%
of the calls are unsolicited and indeed represent mobile
telephony abuse/threats.
• We validate our results with public complaint databases
and show that a large fraction of source numbers that
we classify as malicious were previously unknown.
• We also identify a number of interesting cases that help
us better understand the mobile telephony threat.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follow. We
first present related work and background in Section 2 with
discussions on the difference between an earlier telephony
honeypot called Phoneypot [13] and MobiPot. We then in-
troduce MobiPot and its deployment in a realistic setting in
Section 3. Section 4 presents the data that we collect with
the deployment of MobiPot and our analysis of this data.
We present some interesting case studies in Section 5 and
discuss additional seeding options in Section 6. We conclude
the paper in Section 7.
2. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
Honeypots have been extensively used for collecting threat
intelligence in computer networks to fight email spam [31],
malware [10], and attacks in general [30]. They have also
been used to investigate VoIP threats, including spam over
IP and Telephony (SPIT) [35] and other VoIP abuse [9].
In contrast to the use of honeypots for Internet threats,
there has been limited research on telephony honeypots.
There is a MAAWG best practices paper to demonstrate
the benefits of having a telephony honeypot [12]. Close
to our work, Gupta et al. [13] introduced and deployed a
telephony-based honeypot called Phoneypot aimed at inves-
tigating telephony-specific threats like telephony denial-of-
services (TDoS), telemarketing, and telesurveys. Phoneypot
used unallocated telephone numbers to collect evidence of
voice abuse. It did not explore SMS abuse and callers were
not actively engaged. Call audio was not recorded either.
MobiPot differs from Phoneypot in a number of ways and
explores several new areas. Firstly, it specifically focuses
on mobile telephony threats by implementing a dedicated
simcard-based honeypot. Secondly, in addition to calls, Mo-
biPot extends the analysis to include SMS sent to honey-
cards and resulting in a collection of twice as many mes-
sages as calls. Thirdly, in addition to the callers’ source
number, MobiPot records the content of both messages and
calls. We go beyond Phoneypot by seeding the honeypot
numbers in multiple ways and investigating effectiveness of
the seeding approaches. In particular, because we focus on
mobile phones, we are able to study if phone numbers leaked
by malicious applications actually do receive calls.
Besides Phoneypot, there is other related work that tar-
gets telephony threats. Jiang et al. [18] performed analysis
on voice call graphs to detect telephony frauds from call
records. In a following work, the same authors designed and
applied a statistical model to detect spam numbers based on
their footprints on the grey telephone space [19]. Maggi [22]
and Griffin [11] analyzed the voice pishing (vishing) phe-
nomenon on a collection of detailed reports submitted by
the victims through a website they deployed. They showed
that vishing is very popular in the United States and often
conducted by humans, as we confirmed in our work.
3. SYSTEM OVERVIEW AND DEPLOYMENT
As discussed in Section 2, there has been a recent deploy-
ment of a telephony honeypot that investigated and con-
firmed the existence of a wide variety of telephony abuse [13].
In this paper, we propose a mobile specific honeypot system
called MobiPot that differs from this prior work in terms of
its design in a numbers of ways.
First, we focus on mobile phone numbers as the victim and
try to identify attacks specifically targeting mobile users.
For example, we include SMS messages into our study which
were not considered in the previous system [13]. Second, we
want to take a more active approach in engaging the sources
of abuse calls so that we could extract more information
from them. MobiPot does this by engaging the callers and
recording the call audio. The passive approach taken by
prior work did not do this and simply recorded the caller
and called numbers with a timestamp. Third, we consider
seeding the phone numbers (making our honeycards known
to attackers) part of the deployment process, whereas exist-
ing work only passively monitored unused phone numbers.
Figure 1 shows an overview of our systems design.
3.1 System Architecture
To interface with real mobile phone numbers (on a GSM
network with simcards) and at the same time enable au-
tomatic recording of calls and SMS messages, we follow a
hybrid approach in the system design. We use a GSM-VoIP
gateway to virtualize the mobile telephony infrastructure –
including its stack – and real mobile phone numbers in the
form of simcards (i.e., the honeycards) to implement the
physical layer. With the GSM-VoIP gateway, we manage
multiple honeycards and concurrently receive/transmit over
each of them in a single installation. We rely on 8-simcard
version of GoIP (GoIP-8 [21]) as the GSM-VoIP gateway
to register our GSM honeycards with the VoIP soft-switch
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Figure 1: MobiPot Architecture
system running Asterisk 1. The cost of which is approx-
imately 1,000 USD. Asterisk is a well-known open source
telephony switching and private branch exchange service for
Linux. We use SIP as the communication protocol between
Asterisk and GoIP-8. Our implementation runs on a stan-
dard Linux Ubuntu-32bit installation with 4GB of RAM and
500GB of hard-drive.
3.1.1 MobiPot Deployment in China
We configure GoIP-8 with eight honeycards registered in
some of the largest cities of China across two telecom providers
(see Table 1). We use the VoIP soft-switch system to emu-
late a person interacting with the caller. A major challenge
with telephony honeypots, as much with honeypots in gen-
eral, is to keep the attacker (busy) in the system as long
as possible. For that purpose, when a call is received, we
play an automated engaging message with the goal of in-
centivizing the caller to keep the call running. We emulate
a receiver with hearing difficulties by playing pre-recorded
messages (in Chinese) that read Hello. [...] Hello? [...] Do
you hear me? [...] Better now? [...]. Caller and callee num-
bers as well as the content of SMS messages and calls were
recorded and stored in a database. We focus our evaluation
on China for the following reasons.
• China has the largest adoption of mobile phones. Ac-
cordingly to Statista, China tops the world with over
1.2 billion active mobile telephones and 93% penetra-
tion rate [32]. As of now, there are more mobile phones
than traditional landline installations in China.
• Mobile telephony fraud is a serious problem in China.
The Ministry of Public Security in China confirmed
that over 400,000 users reported to be victims of tele-
phony abuse, and accounted for a loss of 10.7 billion
RMB (≈ 1.67 billion USD) in 2014 [28].
• The recording of calls is regulated in many countries,
making it hard to perform a similar study. In US,
for example, the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) dictates a one-party consent for most of
its states, with the exclusion of California and few oth-
ers [3]. However, in China, there is no specific law for
1http://www.asterisk.org
telephony privacy protection which allows us to record
calls legally [23, 5]. We recognize that legitimate users
may misdial honeycards and could send an SMS mes-
sage by mistake. This is no different than phone users
reaching strangers by mistake. We made sure that any
information received by MobiPot was securely main-
tained (in an encrypted database) and was not shared
or used for any purpose other than this study.
In view of these considerations, we chose to have our first
deployment of MobiPot in China. We collected the data us-
ing our system in China for over seven months from August
22nd 2014 to March 27th 2015 (both dates included).
3.1.2 Seeding MobiPot’s Phone Numbers
Another challenge consists of“advertising”phone numbers
used by MobiPot to make them appealing for the attackers
for abuse. Telephony users are known to receive unwanted
calls without the need of advertising their numbers, e.g.,
from telemarketers that automatically call a multitude of
numbers, or simply spam. This could be because the phone
number space is limited and a high fraction of possible num-
bers are allocated. However, to understand how attackers
choose phone numbers that are targeted by them (especially
in a country like China that has a huge population and a
massive number of mobile phones), we design and deploy
MobiPot by carefully exposing its phone numbers. The goal
is to attract as many unsolicited calls as possible for record-
ing and analyzing; therefore, we investigate various ways of
promoting the phone numbers so that more attackers con-
sider these numbers as their targets. Using a PPP model
(Passive, Public and P rivate), we classify honeycards based
on how they are seeded to be attractive for the scrapers and
not for legitimate users.
We organized our eight mobile numbers in groups of two
and seeded six of them with three different techniques – i.e.,
a pair of mobile numbers for each seeding technique. The
remaining two numbers were not seeded. Table 1 shows the
details of our numbers and how and when they were seeded.
Passive honeycards .
Passive honeycards (nsd1 and nsd2) are never seeded.
Calls and SMS messages to these numbers are typically mis-
dialed or randomly targeting phone numbers without any
pre-qualification, or attempts to qualify a phone number as
“interesting/active”. Another reason of unwanted calls and
messages could be prior history, where these numbers might
have been issued previously to some other entity.
Seeding Public Honeycards– Social Network (soc1 and
soc2).
These honeycards are seeded by actively publishing them
at websites in a public domain with the assumption that this
will make them attractive to fraudsters but not to legitimate
users.
Social networking sites like Facebook, Google+, Twitter,
and personal web blogs/web sites could potentially be the
targets for fraudsters to scrape and obtain phone numbers.
Moreover, some of the online dating websites allow users to
provide phone numbers to be a part of their public profile
which can be misused by fraudsters. This idea stems from
research which suggests that fraudsters may be using social
networking sites to entice users to call the numbers they
Label Honeycard number Provider Province
Seeding
Technique Date(s) / Period(s) Type
nsd1 15621192273 China Unicom Shandong
Unseeded N/A Passive
nsd2 13477033614 China Mobile Hubei
soc1 18757194227 China Mobile Zhejiang
Social Networks Dec 4 2014 Public
soc2 13860141274 China Unicom Fujian
mal1 18701408339 China Mobile Beijing
Mobile Malware
Nov 19 2014 – Dec 4 2014
Private
mal2 15602228631 China Unicom Guangdong Dec 11 2014, Feb 19 2015
abs1 13160067468 China Unicom Jiangsu Abuse Lists (Call) Feb 2 2015, Feb 10 2015
Private
abs2 15921962935 China Mobile Shanghai Abuse Lists (Sms) Dec 30 2014, Jan 15 2015
Table 1: Seeding of our honeycards
publish on these sites on false pretexts, like free services or
highly discounted articles [1]. However, the challenge here is
that the fake profile should be popular enough to be chosen
by the fraudsters.
The process of faking profiles and popularizing them is
slower as compared to commenting on popular posts/videos
as the fraudsters are highly likely to be already scraping
the popular sites and blogs. Honeycards can be posted as
comments on existing popular sites and blogs.
We identified social networking websites in China that
are expected to be crawled by cybercriminals. In particular,
we advertised our numbers via three of the most popular
social networking platforms, namely a micro-blogging site
Weibo (Chinese version of Facebook)2, a video streaming site
Youku (Chinese version of Youtube)3, and a blogging site
Baidu Space (discussion forum)4. We publicly advertised
honeycards with a message simulating a change of number
on these websites.
For example, we promoted on Weibo our “change of num-
ber”by embedding popular hashtags in our tweets. Mandela,
the first anniversary of the death of the ### my cell phone
is lost, replaced with a new phone number: 18757194227.
For Youku, we used a script to automatically comment pop-
ular videos – one of this has been rendered over 5 million
times5.
Seeding Private Honeycards– Mobile Malware (mal1
and mal2).
Private honeycards are defined as tokens which are not
seeded in the public domain but directly to fraudsters.
The popularity and adoption of smartphones has greatly
increased the spread of mobile malware, especially popular
platforms like Android. According to a recent threats re-
port [24], almost 800,000 new mobile malware are observed
per quarter. At the end of 2014, over 6 million samples are
known to be in the wild and 10% of them come from Asia,
in particular China. In a study of 1,200 Android malware
apps [36], the authors show that more than 50% of these
malicious apps steal personal information including phone
numbers and contacts.
Our second seeding technique consisted of running mobile
malware on a testing device which we configured with the
honeycards in the contact list. We tracked the leakage of the
contact list in two ways: a) by configuring the handset with
2http://www.weibo.com
3http://www.youku.com/
4Now re-branded as Baidu Cloud: http://yun.baidu.com/
5http://v.youku.com/v show/id XODM4NzE2NDE2
the TaintDroid analysis framework [15]; b) by collecting the
network traffic generated by the malware samples that, e.g.
connected to C&C servers controlled by the attackers.
We obtained from 369 unique samples of malicious An-
droid applications (from 60 families) known to be leaking
private information from Trend Micro. Out of the 60 fam-
ilies, one half consisted of trojanized versions of legit soft-
ware (i.e., repackaged with malware) and the other half were
“standalone”malicious applications offering for example fake
messaging, free wallpapers, ring tones, games, and sexual
content. We ran each malware on a Nexus 4 running An-
droid 4.3 for 5 minutes with manual interactions in order to
trigger possible leakages by, e.g., registering with the appli-
cations or engaging in gaming.
The samples were given to us in batches of three with
220, 140, and 9 samples respectively. We ran the first batch
on Nov 19th 2014 and Dec 2th 2014 (repeating), the second
batch on Dec 11th 2014, and the third batch on Feb 19th
2015. The third batch consisted of malware used in the
sextortion campaign that was ongoing at the time when we
conducted the experiments [25]. Out of the 369 samples,
248 samples (i.e., 67%) successfully executed on our testing
device. By analyzing the 438MB of network traffic collected
at the gateway and the alerts generated by TaintDroid, we
identified 264 leakages towards 140 unique C&C servers. All
leakages occurred over the HTTP protocol.
Seeding Private Honeycards– Abuse Lists (abs1 and
abs2).
There are large number of web sites publishing suspicious
caller numbers, e.g., http://800notes.com. Making calls to
those numbers from the numbers associated with honeycards
is another approach to seed the honeycards.
We extracted 2,236 unique numbers (1,683 of which are
mobiles) from Lajidianhua6 – the largest provider of abuse
call lists in China – and contacted them with two honey-
cards. We used one of the two to send them an engaging
SMS message and the other to make a one-ring call to them.
Our engaging SMS message reads as I am fine with our dis-
cussion. How do we proceed?
In Section 6, we discuss some other seeding methods that
we leave as future work.
4. EVALUATION
In this section, we present the results of our deployment
of MobiPot in China over seven months from August 22th,
2014 to March 27th, 2015. We collected 1,021 SMS mes-
6http://www.lajidianhua.com
sages from 215 senders and 634 voice calls from 413 callers.
We also received 66 MMS messages that we ignored because
they were not supported by the GSM-VoIP gateway. We
first describe our pre-processing of the collected data to fil-
ter out noise. We also provide volume and temporal charac-
teristics of unsolicited calls/SMS messages. Thereafter, we
discuss the effectiveness of our seeding techniques. Finally,
we present a few interesting case studies as results of our
analysis.
4.1 Unsolicited Calls and SMS Messages
We set up MobiPot to understand the ecosystem behind
unsolicited SMS messages and calls that potentially come
from fraudsters who abuse the telephony channel. However,
not all the calls and SMS messages received on MobiPot are
unsolicited. There are multiple reasons why some of them
are not. a) The calls and SMS messages received could be
the result of misdialing by legitimate users. b) honeycards
could have been previously assigned to another legitimate
entity, which may lead to SMS messages and calls received
during our experiments which are meant for those entities.
To decide if a call or SMS message is unsolicited, we adopted
a semi-automated approach. Note that in our definition of
unsolicited, we included unwanted content like spam or robo-
calls that are not necessarily malicious per-se, but are gen-
erally annoying to the user and not wanted.
We first transcribe all calls with an external transcription
service called Wanbo Steno [33]. With all calls transcribed
into Chinese text, we translated SMS and call content into
English using Google Translate. Before the classification
into unsolicited and benign which is a manual process that
is tedious and error prone, we automatically cluster the SMS
messages and calls into groups to aid the manual process.
We used a hierarchical clustering algorithm with Leven-
shtein as the distance metric and Dunn index to cut the
dendrogram. In cases where a URL is embedded in an SMS
message, we adopted the web-reputation service offered by
Trend Micro to classify it. We automatically labeled all SMS
messages as unsolicited that include malicious URL. Calls
and the remaining SMS messages were manually classified
by two researchers with the aid of the automatic clustering
results.
Using this approach, we classified 847 (82.95%) SMS mes-
sages and 366 (57.73%) calls as unsolicited. In total, there
were 215 sources who sent messages to at-least one of the
honeycards.
4.2 Volume and Temporal Characteristics
In this subsection, we provide insights into the temporal
calls and SMS messages patterns received on MobiPot (see
Figure 2). We show the diurnal volume for both benign and
unsolicited SMS messages and calls. As it can be noticed,
on almost all days, MobiPot received more unsolicited calls
and SMS messages as compared to the benign ones.
We collected on average 3.88 unsolicited SMS messages
and 1.68 unsolicited calls per day. There was an increase
in daily SMS message volume from December 2014 onward
during which we performed various seeding exercises on the
honeycards (see Figure 2(a)). We explain the effects of seed-
ing in the following subsections in more detail.
An interesting observation of the benign SMS message
and call volume is that it was very high on two occasions
– much higher than that for unsolicited one. These sharp
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Figure 2: Overall volume
increases also coincide with the dates of our seeding, espe-
cially with seeding of the two honeycards with abuse lists
abs1 and abs2. By checking the sources of these benign
SMS messages and calls, we confirm that almost all of them
are from the abuse lists that we called during the seeding
period. They were not classified as unsolicited because the
content appears to be benign. This suggests that a large
portion of the numbers on the abuse lists are actually be-
nign. We further investigate this suspicion and discuss it in
Section 4.8.
Figure 2(c) and 2(d) report the hourly distribution of calls
and SMS messages. We observe that most of the traffic
was made during business hours. This confirms the findings
reported by [13] that most attack sources blend in with the
normal telephony traffic to appear legitimate.
4.3 Honeycards
In this section, we provide details of the unsolicited SMS
messages and calls received on each of the honeycards. Ta-
ble 2 shows a breakdown of the SMS messages and calls
received over the period when the MobiPot was running.
The first interesting result is that there is a higher likeli-
hood of getting an unsolicited message as compared to unso-
licited call. As we can see from Table 2(a), all the messages
received on nsd1, mal1 and mal2 were unsolicited. Moreover,
there were 664 out of 679 messages (97.79%) received on six
out of eight honeycards (excluding abs1 and abs2, due to
reasons explained in Section 4.2) were unsolicited. On the
other hand, 241 out of 286 (84%) calls were unsolicited after
excluding abs1 and abs2.
During the entire timeframe when the MobiPot was run-
ning, soc1 received the largest number (and percentage) of
abuse calls and messages – 303 out of 317 or 95.58% of the
hits on soc1 were unsolicited. On the other hand, abs1 re-
ceived the smallest number of unsolicited calls and messages
(49 out 190, or 25%). abs1 was also the worst performer
in terms of percentage of unsolicited calls and messages re-
ceived.
As we can notice, the two numbers seeded in the same way
differ considerably in the messages and calls received. We
Table 2: Breakdown of SMS messages and calls before and after seeding. Mann-Whitney statistical test was
used to compute statistical significance. (*) - Tendency, (**) - Significant, (← [) - Before seeding, ( 7→) - After
seeding.
(a) Based on call and message volume
Label
# of SMS messages # of calls # of SMS and calls combined
Total
Unsol-
icited
Seeding
Total
Unsol-
icited
Seeding
Total
Unsol-
icited
Seeding
←[ 7→ p-value ← [ 7→ p-value ←[ 7→ p-value
nsd1 209 209 12 10 221 219
nsd2 20 16 60 54 80 70
soc1 281 278 23 255 0.0** 36 25 6 19 0.025** 317 303 29 274 0.0**
soc2 30 22 4 18 0.005** 53 37 12 25 0.066* 83 59 16 43 0.004**
mal1 81 81 31 50 0.383 97 95 31 64 0.27 178 176 62 114 0.231
mal2 58 58 14 44 0.028** 28 20 5 15 0.155 86 78 19 59 0.035**
abs1 16 6 4 2 0.217 174 43 12 31 0.0** 190 49 16 33 0.0**
abs2 326 177 77 100 0.061* 174 82 25 57 0.068* 500 259 102 157 0.019**
Total 1,021 847 634 366 1,655 1,220
(b) Based on callers and senders
Label
# of senders # of callers # of senders and callers combined
Total
Unsol-
icited
Seeding
Total
Unsol-
icited
Seeding
Total
Unsol-
icited
Seeding
←[ 7→ p-value ← [ 7→ p-value ←[ 7→ p-value
nsd1 5 5 10 9 15 14
nsd2 9 7 50 45 59 52
soc1 22 19 5 14 0.056* 32 22 5 17 0.053* 54 41 10 31 0.01**
soc2 14 9 2 7 0.06* 50 37 12 25 0.066* 64 46 14 32 0.015**
mal1 2 2 1 1 0.398 89 87 30 57 0.251 91 89 31 58 0.267
mal2 11 11 2 9 0.059* 24 19 5 13 0.203 35 30 7 22 0.078*
abs1 14 5 3 2 0.214 46 22 10 11 0.049** 60 27 13 13 0.061*
abs2 147 32 3 29 0.048** 121 65 22 36 0.145 268 97 25 65 0.111
Total 215 84 413 300 583 373
believe this is because of their history and attackers abuse
them differently because they are not equally “dirty”. For
example, there is a big difference between the number of
calls and messages received on soc1 and soc2. soc1 and
soc2 received a total of 317 and 83 unsolicited calls and
SMS messages, respectively. soc1 received 281 SMS mes-
sages and 36 calls, while soc2 received 30 and 53 only, re-
spectively. Out of the 281 and 30 SMS messages received by
soc1 and soc2, 278 (98.9%) and 22 (73.33%) of them were
unsolicited respectively. Similar patterns are observed with
nsd1 - nsd2, mal1 - mal2, and abs1 - abs2. At this point,
we do not know the reason behind this bias, however, as
pointed out by previous literature [13], history of the phone
number (or honeycard in our case) could be one possible
reason. Also note that, these numbers were from different
telecom providers in China, and we suspect that it might
play a role in the observed differences.
Another interesting finding is that 289 out of 301 SMS
messages and calls on nsd1 and nsd2 combined were found
to be unsolicited. This shows a probability of 0.96 of receiv-
ing an unwanted call or SMS message even if the number is
not seeded (with slightly higher chances of receiving an un-
wanted message than that for calls at 98.25% v/s 88.88%).
Again, this could have been heavily influenced by the history
of the honeycard and might not be interpreted as a finding
with general applicability.
We further explain data presented in Table 2 in the next
subsection to show effectiveness of seeding.
4.4 Effect of Seeding on Honeycards
In this subsection, we focus on analyzing the effectiveness
of our seeding mechanisms. We first show the per-token
volume of SMS messages and calls, see Figure 3 (a–f). To
provide easy reference, we indicate in the figure (bars on
the x-axis) the time when each honeycard was seeded using
different seeding methodology as explained in Section 3.1.2.
We notice sharper increases in the volume and sources
right after seeding in many cases, most noticeable in abs1
and abs2. We separately explain the reasons for each of
honeycard later in this section. Although (cumulative) vol-
ume gives us a general idea of the total number of unso-
licited SMS messages and calls received, in this section, we
will focus on finding out whether the contribution comes
from more unique senders/callers or more messages/calls per
sender/caller. Figure 3 (g–l) plots the cumulative number
of sources. It shows that there is an significant increase in
the number of unique sources during seeding of honeycards
that had contributed to the increase in volume. This serves
as a clear indication that telephony fraudsters are actively
looking for new targets by, e.g., contact leakage from mo-
bile malware, instead of simply targeting numbers that are
“alive”.
4.4.1 Abuse on soc1 and soc2
The use of social networks in seeding was very effective,
especially in the case of soc1 where the total number of
messages and calls received after seeding was statistically
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Figure 3: (Cumulative) number of unsolicited calls (a–f) and sources (g–l) for SMS messages and calls per
honeycard. On the x-axis, the green vertical bar (|) denotes the time(s) when the honeycard was seeded.
Note that we do not show the benign sources from figure (g–l). Calls are represented by blue color and SMS
messages with red. Benign is represented by o-o and unsolicited by x-x. For example, unsolicited calls are
represented by blue x-x and benign SMS messages by red o-o.
significantly higher (p = 0.0 and p = 0.025, respectively)
than the total number of messages and calls received before
seeding. This can easily be observed by the sudden increase
in the rate in which SMS messages were received right after
seeding (indicated by green bars on the x-axis). The increase
in the case of soc2 was not as dramatic, but the Mann-
Whitney statistical test also shows significant difference (p =
0.005) for SMS messages received before and after seeding,
and a distinct trend toward significance (p = 0.066) in the
case of calls. This is the first sign of our success of seeding
the public honeycards soc1 and soc2 on online social media
which resulted in more unsolicited SMS messages and calls
than benign ones.
The profile of account used for soc1 was picked up by
a media website called Xinhua Quanmei7 which broadcasts
daily news in the form of spam. We received a total of 221
messages related to websites involved in adware campaigns.
This is also the most prevalent cluster of messages from the
contributor 106582622 (see Table 4). All the messages from
this source were received right from the day on which soc1
was seeded.
In addition to the volume of calls and messages received
by soc1 and soc2, we found that the number of sources
contacted either soc1 or soc2 is significantly higher after
seeding as compared to that before seeding (p = 0.01 and
p = 0.015, respectively). However, we found that individual
numbers of sources for calls and messages for both soc1 and
soc2 has approached acceptable levels of statistical signif-
icance but definitely not statistically significant. soc2 re-
ceived fewer hits as compared to soc1, but at the same time
were targeted by more sources.
4.4.2 Abuse on mal1 and mal2
We seeded mal1 and mal2 four times on different dates (see
Table 1 and green bars on x-axis on Figure 3(b), 3(e), 3(h)
and 3(k). In Table 2(a), we use the first seeding date as a
reference point to calculate the statistical significance.
From Table 2(a) we notice that there is no significant ef-
fect of seeding on the dirtiness of mal1. However, we do
see a statistical difference on the number of messages re-
ceived when mal2 was seeded. We also tested all four time
periods for computing the statistical significance level; how-
ever do not see any difference and found the same results.
There is a sudden rise in the number of unsolicited calls for
mal1 (see Figure 3(b)) and unsolicited messages for mal2 (see
Figure3(e)) after the second round of seeding. As discussed
in Section 3.1.2, the second and third rounds of seeding were
more effective as we found more recent malicious set of ap-
plications which leaked the phone numbers to the Internet.
mal1 received a total of 81 messages from two sources,
out of which 79 were from 106588302. All of these mes-
sages were advertisement messages with no URL links in
them. The other two messages were from 10690123590110
and have a URL in it http://wap.guanxi.me. Apparently,
these two messages appeared on the same date when mal1
was seeded the first time (see Figure 3(h)). We believe that
this was the result of our seeding exercise and some ap-
plication did leak our honeycards. Interestingly, we found
that mal2 also received the same messages from a different
sender 1065502004955590110 on the same date when mal2
was seeded the first time. We believe the two source numbers
are spoofed and owned by the same attacker. Our efforts
7http://www.xhqm.cn/
show some early insights on seeding honeycards privately
through malicious applications. This serves as the second
sign of our successful seeding exercises. We also found that
there is a clear tendency to significance (p = 0.059) be-
tween the total number of messages before and after mal2
was seeded the first time.
4.4.3 Abuse on abs1 and abs2
The third and final seeding exercise was performed us-
ing abs1 and abs2, where these two honeycards were seeded
directly by contacting the known abuse phone numbers. Fig-
ure 3(c) and 3(f) show the total (cumulative) call and SMS
message volume before and after seeding dates. Note that
unlike other seeded honeycards, abs1 and abs2 were seeded
at different times.
As it can be noticed from both figures that there has been
a noticeable increase in the number of calls and messages on
both abs1 and abs2. We believe that the more noticeable
increase in abs1 and abs2 are characteristics of the seeding
methodology of calling and sending SMS messages to num-
bers on the abuse list, in that the call and SMS messages
most likely attracted human attention immediately since it
requires human interaction with the attacker. Note that the
increase in volume for abs1 and abs2 applies to benign SMS
messages and calls as well.
We used only the first seeding date as a reference to gen-
erate population before and after seeding, and use Mann-
Whitney to compute the statistical significance. We found
that there is a statistically significant difference between the
number of calls received by abs1 before and after seeding
(p = 0.0). On the other hand, we only found a margin at
the edge of significance for messages and calls received by
abs2 before and after seeding (p = 0.061 and 0.068 respec-
tively). We also found that the total number of senders
in abs2 and total number of callers in abs1 be statistically
higher after seeding (p = 0.048 and p = 0.049, respectively).
Immediately after seeding on both dates, there were many
fraudulent transaction messages received by abs1 and abs2.
Some examples of these messages (translated in English and
masked for privacy) are
• ICBC: 62122640000XXXXXXXX; Account: account-
ing Liping; received, please return!
• Confirmed Kazakhstan, also grew a position of waiting
before QQ news, I just called and asked, and transfers
it to me. The fifth branch of the Sichuan branch of
China Construction Bank 52409438XXXXXXXX.
• Agricultural Bank; number: 62284801208XXXXXXXX;
Beneficiary: Lu Yudan; Longgang, Pingshan Branch,
Shenzhen Branch
Moreover, there were a lot of calls and SMS messages from
legitimate users to verify our identity, e.g., in asking whether
we know each other (see Figure 3(c) and 3(f)). We believe
this happened because these (legitimate) peers had their
phone numbers listed on the dedicated sites of telephony
abuse lists. Following are possible reasons of having these
numbers listed on the abuse lists: (a) an adversary spoofed
legitimate users’ phone numbers and reached out to other
people; (b) their mobile phones were infected by malware
that used the phones as a bridge (e.g., to send malicious
messages without notifying the user); (c) their telephone
numbers were previously employed by a malicious actor; and
(d) an adversary voluntarily published the number in form
of a complaint.
4.5 Classification of Threats
We perform some simple classification on the unsolicited
SMS messages and calls, and show our results in Table 3.
We find that most unsolicited SMS messages are spam with
fewer than 10% being scam messages. On the other hand,
scams and spam contribute about equal share in unsolicited
calls. We believe this is a sign that attackers find it more
effective to scam victims by calling. Another interesting
finding is the use of URL in unsolicited SMS messages. It
has been very effective to scam victims.
Table 3: Breakdown of honeycards by threats. (HC)
- Human Call, (RC) - Robocall
Label
SMS Calls
Spam
Scam
Spam Scam Others
URL Ad Survey HC RC HC RC HC
nsd1 193 15 0 1 0 0 1 2 7
nsd2 0 16 0 0 5 15 3 3 28
soc1 223 37 0 18 2 6 1 9 7
soc2 0 20 0 2 4 5 0 10 18
mal1 2 79 0 0 1 1 13 4 76
mal2 3 52 0 3 1 2 1 3 13
abs1 0 5 0 1 1 20 3 1 18
abs2 0 85 61 31 5 14 15 12 36
The results of categorization into human calls and robo-
calls are also interesting. We found a significantly bigger
share of spamming attacks be robocalls (63 against 19),
while scam calls have a more equal share between human
calls and robocalls (44 and 37, respectively). This seems to
be intuitive as scams probably requires higher sophistication
in terms of social engineering and phishing, and will have
higher success rate when it is conducted by human beings.
There are more than 50% of the unsolicited calls that are
classified as others, which include a large number of robocalls
with limited or no conversations.
4.6 Hot Sources
Table 4 shows the biggest contributors of the unsolicited
SMS messages and calls. As expected, these SMS messages
are mostly spam with URL and advertisements. Interest-
ingly, the senders of the SMS messages are either the service
provider itself (10086 is the number of China Mobile) or SMS
gateways (services offered by the mobile service provider
with a prefix of 106). It appears that attackers use such
services to reach out to a large number of victims in a con-
venient and low-cost way, and the mobile service provider
does not stop such spamming with its services. One ex-
ample is 106558000623, a marketing content provider called
Brisk Hayat8, which broadcasted 193 messages advertising
subscription services.
The top contributor to unsolicited calls is from a landline
number in Guangzhou, the third largest city in China. This
number has been reported to various abuse lists, and the
content of the call is mostly investment invitation into stock
market and companies.
All mobile calling numbers were from China, with the ex-
ception of four foreign-looking numbers. We validated our
8http://dysh.qingk.cn/
Table 4: Hot Sources
(a) SMS messages
Sender Total Description Classification
106582622 223 Spam URL
106558000623 193 Spam URL
10086 89 Spam Ad
106588302 79 Spam Ad
(b) Calls
Caller Total Description Classification
02066335588 20 Spam Robocall
15813449813 6 Others Robocall
15342606832 5 Others Robocall
15719210386 4 Scam Human call
results by performing HLR lookups and querying the SS7
signaling network with Number Portability Lookup [4]. We
confirmed that only one of these (+6698240898) was an in-
ternational number registered with a sim-card in Thailand.
Even though the other three numbers pretended to be US
based (i.e., starting with +1), they were actually invalid num-
bers likely spoofed by the attackers to avoid easy detection.
All these international-looking mobile numbers were fraud-
ulent callers/senders, e.g., a fake provider extorting money
with a pretext of contract expiration or a fake postal service
requesting a fee to release a parcel retained in customs.
4.7 Campaigns Detection
In this section, we dig deeper into the SMS message con-
tent in hope of revealing connectivity among various SMS
senders. We believe that attackers are typically using multi-
ple mobile numbers to send out SMS messages due to, e.g.,
maximum number of free SMS messages each simcard could
send and to remain low profile to avoid detection. Here
we exploit similarities among the SMS messages to detect
senders that are part of the same campaign and, conse-
quently, which honeycards they target.
Our analysis starts with splitting a message α to form a
set of words Rα (see Figure 4 for the pseudo code). We then
create a graph where the nodes represent the messages and
an edge between two nodes denotes that there is similarity
(in terms of Jaccard similarity index between corresponding
two sets of words) between the two messages. Finally, we use
the Leading Eigenvector community detection algorithm [26]
to find clusters, which are the campaigns detected.
With the set of sources that form a campaign and tar-
get one or more honeycards detected, we present the results
in another graph as shown in Figure 5. In this graph, the
bigger nodes represent honeycards and the smaller nodes
represent various campaigns detected using the algorithm
shown above, with the number inside a small node repre-
senting the total number of sources in that campaign. An
edge between a campaign node and a honeycard node indi-
cates that a subset of sources of the campaign targeted the
honeycard. An edge between two campaign nodes denotes
that there are common sources between the two campaigns.
From Figure 5, we notice:
• There are multiple campaigns targeting a particular
honeycard (e.g., five campaigns targeting explicitly soc1).
• There are multiple sources which are part of the same
1: procedure CampaignDetection(S, λ)
2: S← TranslateChineseToEnglish(S) . S is a
collection of messages
3: R← Tokenize(sms ∈ S) . Tokenize and remove
stopwords
4: G← Graph()
5: G.add vertices(α) ∀ α ∈ R . α is sms id
6: for all α, β ∈ (R
2
)
do
7: sim(α, β)← |Rα∩Rβ ||Rα∪Rβ | . Jaccard similarity
between each pair of message
8: if sim(α, β) > λ then
9: G.add egde(α, β, sim(α, β))
10: end if
11: end for
12: C← EigenvectorCommunityDetection(G) .
Community detection algorithm to cluster graph
13: end procedure
Figure 4: Campaigns Detection Algorithm
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Figure 5: Social graph of campaigns and honeycards
based on content of the messages
campaign. This confirms our intuition that attackers
use multiple numbers to perform their attacks.
• There are common sources between campaigns (an edge
between the two campaigns targeting mal2). This sug-
gest that there are multiple campaigns run by the same
attacker.
• There are campaigns that target multiple honeycards
(e.g., the same campaign targeting both mal2 and soc2.
This suggests that attackers may use multiple ways of
identifying potential victim numbers.
Our findings suggest that the attacks exploiting the tele-
phony channel are complicated and organized activities, sim-
ilar with cyber-attacks conducted on the Internet. We be-
lieve that MobiPot is useful in collecting evidence of such
organized activities and the data collected as well as analy-
sis like this provide a first step in better understanding them.
Note that, we only show campaigns in Figure 5 which have
multiple sources.
4.8 Complementing Current Technology
Our deployment of MobiPot has been effective in record-
ing many unsolicited SMS messages and calls with the effec-
tive seeding of honeycards. In this subsection, we correlate
the findings with existing technologies, namely, public com-
plaint lists, to see if there are new numbers found.
We cross-checked the unsolicited source numbers obtained
on MobiPot with public databases of complaint numbers, in
particular, Lajidianhua. We also installed Sogou Haoma9, a
popular mobile application that informs the user whether
the incoming call or SMS is untrusted, and exported its
abuse list consisting of 57,441 numbers. Lastly, we wrote
scripts to search occurrences of these source numbers on
Google to find any evidence of the abuse of them.
Overall, 77.47% of the unsolicited numbers recorded by
MobiPot were unreported in three public sources we ac-
cessed. The percentage goes up to 89% when excluding abs1
and abs2 which were seeded via Lajidianhua (also used for
this measurement). This suggests that MobiPot opened up
a new and effective avenue in finding sources of unsolicited
SMS messages and calls, and could potentially be used to
complement existing technologies in better understanding
and defending against the attacks.
5. CASE STUDIES
Besides the main results presented in the previous section,
we also find some interesting cases that we believe are worth
sharing. In particular, we report cases that are specific to
mobile phone users which are not found in existing work of
telephone-based honeypots [13].
5.1 Re-using Mobile Numbers
In a big country like China, it is not uncommon that pre-
viously allocated and terminated mobile numbers are re-
assigned to new subscribers. This is annoying to the new
subscriber since she might receive calls and messages in-
tended for the ex-owner; when it happens to our honeycards,
the effect is two-fold.
On one hand, legit calls and messages intended for the
ex-owner add to the pool of those that need to be identified
and filtered for the purpose of analyzing unsolicited ones.
For example, we identified two different numbers calling and
sending messages to nsd2 asking for the same person, which
we believe to be highly likely legit calls and messages to
the ex-owner. On the other hand, attackers may pretend
to be the ex-owner and, e.g., request one-time passwords
to be forwarded to the pretended ex-owner as an attempt to
compromise the two-factor authentication system. We found
22 requests of this type via SMS, out of which 18 were for
Alipay and 4 were for QQ. For example, soc2 received the
following verification message:
[Tencent] Verification code 658339. Use it to change the
password of the QQ number 64******5. Leaking the verifi-
cation code has a risk. The QQ Security Center.
Clearly, this represents a security issue for the new sub-
scriber.
5.2 Sophisticated Scamming
We found a potentially scamming call that appears to
be the first step of a sophisticated scam earlier reported in
China10. In this first step of the attack, the caller pretends
to be the big boss of the victim and demands that the victim
visit his office the next morning. On the way to meet the
“big boss”, the victim will receive a second call directing her
to the secretary of the big boss to settle banking accounts
for commission or reimbursement issues first.
9http://haoma.sogou.com/
10http://www.chinanews.com/sh/2015/01-14/
6969548.shtml and http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog
5d881ee30102v7xh.html
5.3 Attacks Specifically Targeting Mobile Users
A primary objective of the mobile telephony honeypot is
to collect evidence of attacks targeting mobile users. For
example, in a scenario reported in the previous subsection,
the scam took place when the victim was on the move to
meet the “big boss”. In general, all attacks employing short
message services are mobile victim specific. SMS enables the
attacker to launch more sophisticated attacks that might not
be possible against traditional landline installations. In this
section, we report cases where an attacker uses both call and
SMS to conduct the attack.
We found more than 10 scamming cases where the same
attacker makes phone calls and at the same time sends SMS
messages, with contents of the call and SMS message being
about the same. As an example, 18069953481 gave on Dec.
30th a first call with the pretext of knowing her peer. A cou-
ple of minutes after, the same source sent a message asking
for QQ messaging’s account details with the excuse of re-
funding some credit. Lately during the day, we received an
additional call from the same number in which the author
asked if the message was received and demanding for the
messaging account, including personal name and surname.
There were also six cases where the attacker started with
a casual conversation regarding some transactions, and then
followed with an SMS message that gave the account num-
bers for bank transfers or instant messaging. Intuitively, this
is to take advantage of SMS in its clarity and convenience in
sharing large numbers that are hard to memorize. For ex-
ample, 13691049676 performed three social-engineered calls
before sending an SMS message with the information for the
money deposit on Alipay.
6. OTHER SEEDING TECHNOLOGIES
In this section, we briefly present other seeding technolo-
gies that potentially provide incentives for fraudsters to scrape
or steal phone numbers. Due to various constraints, espe-
cially the limited number of honeycards we have, we did
not implement these techniques and leave them for further
investigation in future work.
Figure 6: Prominent seeding targets for MobiPot
• Public Discussion Forums: Posting phone numbers
on public forums like USENET is another way of seed-
ing the honeycards on the web. The discussion groups
in USENET are ranked by the largest number of arti-
cles read, largest number of articles posted, and largest
of bytes posted, etc.
• DNC List: The Do Not Call lists or registry is a list of
personal phone numbers which the telemarketers are
prohibited from calling. However, this list is poten-
tially another source of phone numbers for fraudsters.
Therefore, some numbers can be posted on DNC lists
of the country where the MobiPot is setup.
• Questionable websites: Websites in a few categories
are more likely to be scraped by fraudsters. Such cate-
gories include those of drugs, gambling, and adult dat-
ing, porn, or sex related sites. Most of these sites are
known to be spam/malware intensive and thus come
under the classification of “questionable”.
• Advertisements: Advertisement websites which may
have widespread use like Craigslist is also a viable
target. Researchers had showed how Nigerian scam-
mers target Craigslist to harvest phone numbers [29].
Craigslist has numerous sections devoted to jobs, hous-
ing, community, gigs, resumes, and discussion forums.
Thus, another option is posting advertisements with
honeycards in such websites. However, since such sites
have legitimate usage, it is important that the adver-
tisement does not attract the legitimate users. Alter-
natively, phone numbers could be publicized by filling
in fake details in the advertisement forms that pop up
while visiting particular websites or during URL redi-
rection.
• Free Services: Websites offering free services are
other places from which the phone numbers are likely
to be harvested. These sites may give free music, free
ringtones, free or discounted coupons, etc. Some sites
may offer rewards to fill out surveys, in which case it
is important to distinguish between the legitimate and
illegitimate survey sites.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we introduced the first mobile telephony hon-
eypot. We implemented this mobile telephony honeypot sys-
tem with honeycards in a real system called MobiPot. We
seeded these honeycards in three distinct ways and stud-
ied the effectiveness of the seeding mechanisms in attracting
previously unknown fraudsters.
Overall, we collected 1,021 SMS messages from 215 senders
and 634 calls from 413 callers. We confirmed that over
half of them were unsolicited. We investigated the biggest
contributors, classified threats, and studied the connectivity
among SMS senders. Finally, we also described a number
of interesting cases that we hope will help us gain a better
understanding regarding how mobile telephony threats are
conducted.
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